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The present essay is an attempt at pursuing understanding about the widely spread tendency 
of human thinking to perceive ”nature” as the outside of human society and culture. The 
attempt has been carried out by investigating, and also developing, the notion of compassion 
found in selected writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78). The essay follows Rousseau 
in finding compassion a fundamental aspect of the existence of, at least, many animal species 
and then examining how the social development of humanity has affected our relation to this 
”pure emotion of nature”. Inspired by Rousseau, and secondary level education about modern 
sciences, the essay adopts an outlook of nature as all-encompassing connectedness of worldly 
beings, outside of which nothing can exist. Thus human societies, in which ideas about 
defining nature as the outside of humanity are conceived, are also recognised as being 
thoroughly in and of nature. This result will then provide some interesting ways of viewing, 
for example, the nature of ”environmental problems” that human societies are nowadays 
known to be facing.
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When ancient humans started building cities out of stone and clay, the feeling of living in an 
environment made by the hands of ourselves as opposed to just lodging in caves that had always 
been there, or some temporary huts made of sticks and leaves, must have been somewhat 
extraordinary. We probably have loved the familiarity, safety and order of our self-made 
environments from the very beginning. This love frequently appears in everyday language, when we
say a small rural town has ”nothing but a gas station” or a person living on the ”remote” (from 
what?) countryside lives ”in the middle of nothing”, for example. Sometimes, when the busy urban 
life gets too tiring, we want to take off a bit and ”relax in the calm of nature”, only to eventually 
”return to civilisation” to continue our everyday hustle and bustle. While the phrases selected here 
have a rather modern tinge, the tendency of thought they are used to illustrate, are probably as old 
as civilisation itself. The varying themes of opposition between countryside–civilisation and 
wilderness–agriculture have long and clear enough roots in history to validate the point. 
Were one to enquire about the theme of the present essay, the pair of words ”nature” and 
”humanity” could be given in reply. The existence of the words itself, or rather the conceptual 
distinction they suggest, ignites a forest of philosophically interesting thoughts into which the 
present essay will dive. 
What is and what is not nature is a surprisingly little problematised question. Usually, 
whether in everyday conversations, old books of philosophy or modern academic papers on 
ecology, one sees the word ”nature” being used quite carefreely as a concept to roughly mark that in
the world which has not been touched by human hands, as opposed to ”culture”. A forest for 
example, according to this gut feeling, is definitely ”nature”. So are trees felled by storms and elks 
that consume the bark of these and other, healthy trees. But when we hear the roaring of chainsaws 
and harvesters in the forest, many of us are probably going to feel slightly differently. The 
chainsaws, one easily tends to feel, are intruders in the forest whereas the elks are not.
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In order to understand this feeling, one must consider the question of humanity. We students 
of university, citizens of a country, peoples of the world are all of the mammalian species homo 
sapiens. We are humans. But what is it that makes us human, our humanity? This is a question 
philosophers have always been interested in, and a lot of theories have been written about the 
subject. Traditionally, the question of nature, as if by definition, has gone together with that of 
humanity. The traditions of both philosophy and everyday attitudes, rather uncritically, suggest that 
humanity is precisely that which separates us from nature, the very special character of our and only
our existence (whoever this ”we” might be). Nature is thus seen as the world outside the realm of 
humanity. Many suggestions have been made throughout history as to what could this 
distinguishing feature, humanity, consist of: rationality, language, self-consciousness, a special 
access to something ”supernatural” or divine, to name a few without jumping into any problems of 
each right now. The roots of this tradition of thinking are obviously ancient.
However, the worldview of current scientific knowledge, if nothing else, convincingly 
invites us to answer the question of humanity in a different manner. Through industrious 
investigations of nature, we have come to realise that humans are of an animal species with an 
evolutionary history which we can trace back to forms of life that were not human. We may indeed 
trace this continuum of organisms from humans all the way back to the beginning of life on Earth to
unicellular microorganisms. The features and possibilities that characterise humans today are the 
result of millions of years of biological evolution. 
Humans have indeed built big skyscrapers, computers and complex social systems but there 
is no qualitative, or categorical, difference between these and, for example, anthills, beaver dams or 
the flock behaviour of birds. From the viewpoint of evolutionary history of life, the only real 
distinctions between humans and the living beings of their environment are related to bodily 
structures and bio-chemical composition. The distinctions are purely physical, and they result from 
the organisms' myriad interactions with their environment. This is an outlook of humanity about 
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which millions of children in every part of the globe are learning in schools. Scientists do not regard
it as a wild hypothesis but a fact backed up by enormous observational evidence that we descend 
from some non-human primates. Yet, the opposition ”humanity–nature” still stands proud in 
everyday thoughts and attitudes of the vast majority of us humans.1
This confusion is the starting observation of the present essay. On one hand, there is no 
question about the fact that humanity belongs in nature like everything does. On the other, we live 
in civilisations that are more or less based on the idea of human separatedness from, and dignity 
over, nature. Our naturality is quite literally written in our DNA while our separatedness from 
nature could be said to be written in our ”cultural DNA”. In other words, our genes carry the 
biological inheritance of  millions of years of both human and nonhuman ancestors, but at the same 
time we also carry cultural heritage from some much later human ancestors.2 Nowadays that we 
have recognised the reality of our genetic nature and history, the knowledge about our naturality has
become an important part of our cultural tradition, the tradition which has long been emphasising 
our separatedness from nature. Here one may see a fundamental confusion at the heart of society, 
regarding our very existence.
However, the extent of the problem is by no means limited to mere conceptual ambiguity in 
what is humanity. Rather, how the worldview of our culture accords with reality has profound 
effects on the concrete relationship of our species with the environment. Only in the recent decades 
has the awareness of the scope and effects of humanity's environmental impact gradually spread 
wider in our societies. Global environmental problems, such as climate change and biodiversity 
loss, caused to a large extent by human activities, are now, on the 21st century, slowly becoming a 
more and more central theme in politics.3 
1 One might also suggest this idea is so deeply encoded into our thinking and language that it would be plausible to say all of us, 
no matter what, are bound to thinking in terms of this opposition. This branch of thought, though important for the subject 
matter, will not be expressly followed in the present essay. 
2 In evolutionary theories, a distinction between genetic and cultural evolution is recognised. Basically all life engages in genetic 
evolution which means the spontaneous passing of genes in reproduction. Much fewer species have also cultural evolution which
means the passing of acquired skills, knowledge etc. to new generations through imitation, training and such. (See 
Tahvanainen1987.)
3 For all that the scientists know, this political change should have started a lot earlier, and at least now it had better be remarkably
faster and more determinate than it still is today. At the time of writing, the pandemic outbreak of a coronavirus has resulted in 
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The ”environmental crisis” of our times has been seen as a symptom of humanity's relation 
with the environment being broken. And it indeed is an important aim of the present essay to find 
deeper understanding about this brokenness of our relationship with nature. The aim is by no means 
totally clear, and not least because, when it comes to ”philosophical” ponderings on humanity and 
nature, it will not suffice just to ”analyse” the concepts and clarify their meanings, neither will it be 
enough to find out logical necessities and metaphysical truths about the subject. It will not do to 
isolate the questions ”What is nature?” and ”What is humanity?” and treat them as if independent 
from a host of other questions. Instead, in order to have understanding on the forest of problems 
lying behind these seemingly straightforward questions, one needs sincere involvement in actuality 
and deep will to learn from nature. One needs to let themselves be taught by the environing world. 
Combining this demand with the requirement of having to be secluded in a study, writing, is just 
much more easier said than done. But that is what we have to try.
It is obvious that the problematic that has been sketched out in this introduction cannot be 
fully addressed in a short essay like the present one. Thus the aim of the essay is not to fill the 
whole sketch with texture but rather to occupy a little spot from the scene that has been sketched 
and work at least something out in that spot, keeping in mind the vast environing scene. Effectively, 
the essay revolves around some writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78) whose philosophical 
method and ideas have served as a remarkable influence in forming the thoughts expressed in the 
essay. It is worth noting that the object of the essay is not to attempt scholarly work on Rousseau 
but rather to use his writings as a guide in dealing with the abovementioned confusions regarding 
nature and humanity.
The leading guide of the present essay will be Rousseau's notion of compassion. The aim of 
the essay is to find inspiration from this notion for thinking about the apparent friction between how
strongly restricting the insatiable pursuit of profit of the global economy for the sake of the health of the nations. It is still too 
early to say whether the current situation will lead into a more profound political change. Whether, for example, as 
”environmentalists” have been insisting for decades, the global environmental problems will finally be recognised on the level of
world politics as an acute crisis threatening the health of the nations and requiring measures as radical, but not as temporary, as 
the current pandemic.
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humanity is actually related to nature and how this relation is conceived of in human societies. 
Following Rousseau, the present essay will twine the topic of compassion together with discussing 
the birth of human society, and its relation to the place in which it emerged. Chapter 2 will address 
the latter topic while chapter 3 will dive more expressly to the topic of compassion. Chapter 4, then,
has been reserved for concluding remarks.
The main pre-assumption that the essay will examine and, in the end, defend is the 
conviction that humanity's deep connectedness to the rest of nature is a fact, and that denying this 
fact constitutes a multi-faceted host of problems in our species' relationship with the environment. 
In terms of ”philosophical analysis”, the conceptual difference between humanity and nature will be
put under a critical investigation, based on considerations as sincere as possible about the nature of 
both nature and humanity in it.
Lastly, it is worth noting that the present essay is not an attempt to solve any particular 
problems on specific ”fields” of philosophy. Rather, the style of the essay could be characterised as 
contemplative and illustrative. This does not mean that the value of getting problems solved is by 
any means disregarded. In the age of global ecological crisis we are, day in day out, faced by 
political and moral problems regarding the sustainability of humanity's existence. While not trying 
to provide a political program or normative ethics, the essay can be celebrated as succesful if it can 
provide at least some food for real-life-directed thinking amid all the theoretical meandering.
2. Society Sprouting
This chapter is dedicated to pondering how the modern way of human existence, society, came into 
being. Society, or culture, is conventionally conceived of as the realm of humanity as a counterpoint
to nature. It is the very symbol of humanity, the house which we have built against nature. It should 
be noted that, in the present essay, a factual account of historical events is not being attempted. 
Rather, two different approaches, represented by Rousseau and John Locke (1634–1704), to the 
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question of society will be contrasted and then compared with regard to their illuminating effects. 
The two approaches are examined here especially with regard to their historicality, that is how they 
relate to the historical nature of human development. Some broader views will then be opened in the
next chapter.
Both Locke and Rousseau wrote some insightful texts on how human society came into being. Both 
of them employ the idea of state of nature which is thought of as the (hypothetical) predecessor of 
human society, the way of human life before society was established. However, the explanatory 
meaning of this notion seems to be quite different for the two thinkers. For Locke, state of nature 
quite straightforwardly answers the question ”Why there is society?”, whereas Rousseau seems to 
be more interested in understanding the relationship between nature and society in general. Even if 
this distinction were too subtle to be helpful, comparing Locke and Rousseau's accounts of the 
transition from state of nature to that of society will provide us a fruitful image of their differing 
views on the nature of humanity and our relation to the environment.
As the title already suggests, Rousseau's famous On the Origin and Foundation of 
Inequality of Mankind (Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes) is 
about inequality. But what Rousseau actually illustrates in the book is the beginning of human 
society. The account given is of course not intended as a description of actual events. Rather, it is a 
quasi-historical fable about a certain scene in human evolutionary history, namely the appearing of 
human society. This scene (that did not happen in a flash) appears in Rousseau's work as a line 
dividing two epochs in the history of humanity: the state of nature and that of society. As Rousseau 
himself points out, even though the investigation of humanity's ”natural state” is not factually 
possible4, thinking about how humanity might have been before society, and how society has 
changed humanity, should provide us in the present day with some thought-provoking insights 
(Rousseau 1972b, 160–1).
4 Today, through fossil evidence, we can actually observe quite a lot about the life of ancient humanity.
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Although Rousseau is expressly cautious about making any too far-fetched speculations 
about the pre-social humans' actual way of life or bodily features, yet in the book he vividly 
describes the life of two-legged wild mammals not too different from our modern perception of 
prehistorical humans. These mammals roamed in forests and plains, gathered whatever edible they 
might easily find, slept in caves or in the shade of trees and led spontaneous lives guided by 
instincts, with no mental capacities to be concerned about future or really care about anything but 
the natural drives of nutrition, reproduction and avoidance of bodily damage (ibid. 168–78; 181–3). 
In addition to the obvious physical characteristics, Rousseau recognises two features in 
humans in the state of nature that no other animal has. One of them is ”free will” the obvious 
problems of which will not be discussed in the present essay. Another uniquely human, and much 
more interesting for the present purposes, characteristic Rousseau finds in pre-social humans is their
”faculty of improvement”. By this Rousseau means that humanity, both individually and as a 
species, can develop through time, while all other species are as they are, unchangingly: ”a brute 
[unlike human] is, at the end of a few months, all he ever will be during the rest of his life; and his 
species, at the end of a thousand years, are exactly what it was the first year of that thousand”. 
(ibid.). Nowadays we know that these speculations were not quite correct with respect to nonhuman 
animals. However, this mistake in facts does not really undermine Rousseau's insights into human 
society. We will see that recognising the fact of human development is rather crucial in 
distinguishing Rousseau's view of the origin of society from that of Locke's. 
Now that we have an idea of how humanity in the state of nature seemed to Rousseau, let us 
find how the transition to society happened, according to him. In probably one of the most well-
known passages of On Inequality Rousseau states that the first man who fenced an area of land and 
claimed it their own was the founder of society. However, as Rousseau immediately notes after this 
line, the process which lead to the idea of owning and private property probably lasted for 
generations and had to be preceded by various other developments in human thinking. (ibid. 213).
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It is indeed a very important point in Rousseau's account of the transition from nature to 
society that the process was not simple and straightforward. As has been pointed out, humans in 
Rousseau's state of nature were not rational thinkers, unlike ”philosophers pretend” (ibid. 180–6). In
state of nature there was no thinking beyond one's next meal, no language or universal concepts to 
think of distant things, no ideas except direct observations of one's surroundings. Rousseau was 
aware that the appearance of all these complicated phenomena of human consciousness, that we 
today take for granted, must have taken ages to develop, yet by humanity's natural tendency to 
improvement the process was possible. With surprising congeniality to modern paleoecological 
theories, Rousseau suggested that what forced mankind to sharpen their wits and end up with the 
complicated mind familiar to us now were hardships with environment. Life in the wild was not idle
roaming in paradisal gardens but occassionally harsh struggle with environmental conditions, of 
which Rousseau mentions weather and competition for resources.5 (ibid. 213–6).
To sum up, whether or not the details of Rousseau's speculations (ibid. 216–20) are correct, 
is not, as he himself points out, that important. The main idea, that even the processes of attaining 
some sort of conceptual consciousness and the following idea of oneself as a part of certain animal 
species, humanity, took generations to happen is what matters for the purposes of the present essay. 
When humans, on the course of this gradual development, started communicating more intensively 
with each other, the bonds of co-operation got stronger which paved ground to the appearance of 
such phenomena as society, morality, language and passing of knowledge over generations (cultural 
evolution). Only as a part of these complex stages of human development could ideas of our 
separatedness from nature emerge. When we study humans in Rousseau's state of nature, we hardly 
find evidence for any separation from nature6, only a two-legged species of animal among many 
5 In more recent studies it has been suggested that it was actually competition with other humans that mainly drove the evolution 
of more complex intelligence (including self-awareness) and social structures. One's ability to establish and maintain good 
relations with other members in a primitive society became a crucial factor in how much genes one could pass onward to new 
generations. (see eg. Flinn et al 2005).
6 The reader may recall that freedom and ”the faculty of improvement” were mentioned in the text as unique special 
characteristics of humanity. However, to regard the latter as a uniquely human feature is, as was noted, a mistake and there is a 
similar kind of problem regarding the question of freedom that will nevertheless not be discussed in the present essay as that 
discussion would take the text too far from the main topic.
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others.
Let us then compare Rousseau's state of nature with that of Locke's. For Locke (Second 
Treatise §§ 4–15; 87; 89; 99), the difference between state of nature and that of society was rather 
modest and, contra Rousseau, instantaneous. Here the switch from nature to society is seen as 
happening through a mutually agreed contract to formally establish a ”commonwealth” between 
individual people. In Locke's state of nature, humans are from the outset rational individuals 
governed by the ”law of nature”, which for Locke did not mean the laws of physics but various 
rights and duties that (some) humans allegedly have by nature. Examples of these rights include 
one's right to turn the fruits of nature into their ”property” and the right to punish those who harm 
one's ”person” or this ”property”.
Let us take a more careful look at this notion of property. When Rousseau's simple-minded 
forest human picked up an apple and ate it, the situation was with all respects analogous to a bear 
eating an apple. Locke, on the other hand, sees a remarkable difference between the two events. In 
the case of the bear the apple simply becomes a part of the bear's metabolism. This is what happens 
in the human case as well, but in this case there is also something else. The human being, by 
picking up the apple, makes it their rightful property. In general, according to Locke, humans 
become owners by virtue of simply taking things from nature, but for any other species this is not 
the case. This fact, Locke explains, is due to ”the law of nature”. Notice that for Rousseau, the idea 
of property rights needed generations of social development to emerge. But for Locke, this law 
existed already in the state of nature, though ”unwritten, and so nowhere to be found but in the 
minds of men” (ibid. § 136). 
In some sense, Locke's ”law of nature” also renders humans owners of themselves. As noted 
above, in Locke's state of nature every individual human being is free to enforce the law of nature, 
that is to protect their person and their property from alien forces threatening these. This, however, 
easily leads to loops of resentment, excessive punishments and overall insecurity. Thus humans, 
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rational as they are, are quite naturally driven to establish commonwealths, ruled by the majority's 
consent, where a small portion of each individual's natural freedom, the freedom to enforce the law 
of nature, is given up for the common interest of a stable society. (ibid. §§128–131). This seems 
indeed a very natural course of action for rational beings with thinking quite congenial to ours. For 
Rousseau, however, this kind of explanation was not available because he thought humans in the 
state of nature must have had very different psychology from ours.
In addition to the extraordinary intellectual and moral capacities of pre-social humans, there 
is also a noteworthy hierarchy of beings in Locke's state of nature. In this hierarchy, humanity is 
naturally ”property” of God and, in a similar vein, ”inferior ranks of creatures” are there for  
humans to appropriate. Based on this value-laden hierarchy, an order of natural equality among 
humanity is built. There should be no ”subordination among us” since ”we” are all equally of God's 
”workmanship”. It is just reasonable to think that this beloved property of the ”omnipotent and 
infinitely wise Maker” should absolutely be preserved by all costs. Should an individual human 
violate this natural obligation by, for example killing another human, thus discarding their reason, 
that is becoming blind to nature's rational order, they may (and ought) rightly be ”destroyed as a 
lion or a tiger, one of those wild savage beasts with whom men can have no society nor security”. 
(ibid. §§ 4–15). 
The rift between civilised humans endowed with morality and reason and the untamed 
beasts lacking these traits could hardly be more clearly expressed. It is also obvious that this rift 
illustrated by Locke reflects some real human conceptions of the structure of the world. We indeed 
have a tendency to think we are the crown of creation. However, shouldn't Locke, as a philosopher, 
have approached this idea a bit more critically? If the ”law of nature” from which the moral order of
creatures is derived only exists in human mind, shouldn't we be rather cautious about its 
truthfulness? The fact that we have an ideology, no matter how persistent, by no means renders the 
content of that ideology true in reality. True, the ideas Locke describes are widely accepted among 
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humanity but just sticking those ideas on nature and declaring them as its laws is not very 
illuminating if we want to understand nature and society.
How about the historicality of these two ”social theories”, then? We have seen that in Locke's state 
of nature humanity is an orderly collection of self-absorbed rational agents. Society, then, is formed 
through a decision of these agents to join together because they consider it a prudent course of 
action for their selves. As far as Locke is concerned, it seems, these creatures could have descended 
from the heavens just as they are. The intelligence and consciousness of Locke's humans in the state
of nature do not really differ from those of modern humans. It is as if Locke looked at the society 
around him, just imagined a forest scene in place of the city scene, and thus had conjured up his 
”state of nature”, the supposed cradle of modern humanity before his eyes. In Locke's nature, there 
are no signs of any historical development of human nature but instead the supposition of an 
unchanging essence of humanity loaded with a lot of capabilities and tendencies of thought we 
currently happen to have.
On the other hand we have Rousseau's evolutionary ponderings about an animal species 
whose natural capabilities and way of life gradually change through the passing of time. When 
Rousseau imagined forests in place of our cities, he noticed that it will not do to change just the 
environment and consider humans as if they had always been like we observe them now. The genius
of Rousseau, as compared to Locke, is the view of humanity not as an unchanging essence in us and
our ancestors but as the organic nature of ours, developing through interaction with our 
environment. For Rousseau, all the structures of society and morality, rationality and intelligence 
are but accidental superficialities that humanity has acquired through time. They have little to do 
with our fundamental nature as a species rooted in the soil of the Earth. 
It is probably true, though, that Locke was not deeply interested in the relationship between 
humanity and nature, in the first place. What he tried to do was to provide reasonable grounds for 
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the existing social order. To ask how the rather complicated ”state of nature” that he envisions came 
into being was either an uninteresting question for his purposes, or maybe it never crossed his mind 
at all. Thus, rather than simply condemning Locke's views as wrong, which they, under certain 
assumptions, of course are not, we would do better to point our criticism to the limited scope of his 
investigation. The critical question is: Does Locke's fable help us understand the nature of society, 
or humanity, or does it rather just serve as strengthening some misleading prejudices about these 
things? The question is not just about having or not having some facts correct. As has been 
suggested, mistaken views about humanity's relation to the environment may be fertile soil for 
dangerous ideologies and policies.
Of course, there is also a side of simple truthfulness to the issue. One may ask, for example, 
if it is true that humans are, by nature's order, morally superior to wild beasts, or if humans through 
their labour turn nature into their ”property” (Second Treatise §§ 25–51). Even setting aside the 
moral hierarchies and all the refined right/duty structures that Locke's state of nature contains, one 
would do well to consider just the question: is it essential for humanity to be ”civilised” and, by 
virtue of that, categorically distinct from the ”wild” nature? A positive answer seems to be deeply 
rooted not only in Locke but in our culture and everyday thinking both before and after Locke, as 
well. But it is a very different thing to consult our traditional ways of thinking and conceptual 
distinctions on these topics than trying to find the answer from the things of interest themselves. 
Where, in a lion, does its subordination to humans lie? Where in the human species their superiority
in the eyes of God?
For a conclusion, let us (repeat the) claim that this distinction between the ways of thinking 
presented here, that might be labelled historical and ahistorical, displays not just any irrelevant 
quarrel of some old philosophers but a clash of worldviews one of which is in a very important 
sense in agreement with the actual nature of reality while the other fails to attend to it. In Rousseau, 
we find a historical account that, though factually inaccurate at some points, provides us with a 
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realistic outlook to the nature of nature and humanity in it. Locke's account, on the other hand, can 
hardly be regarded as a proper history but rather a clever derivation of results under certain, rather 
wilful, conditions. As such, it may be a fine piece of reasoning. It is nevertheless dubious whether 
this account provides us any plausible understanding to the actual nature of humanity.
The reader is also encouraged to notice that the opposition between historical and ahistorical
views on humanity (and nature) put under focus in this chapter is by no means a mere curiosity of 
the past. A modern perspective to the dispute can be found in the still flourishing debate about 
biological evolution through natural selection. Despite being as well-studied a phenomenon as any, 
evolution is still widely denied on ideological grounds.7 This effectively means that there are a lot of
people who obstinately ignore generally known facts about the nature of humanity and the world we
inhabit. 
Probably one of the most famous contemporary lamenters of, and industrious fighters 
against, this less flattering state of human education is the evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins 
who calls the evolution-denying creationists ”history-deniers” and dubs the ideological obstacle for 
accepting the fact of evolution ”essentialism”. (Dawkins 2009). Similarity of the terms used by 
Dawkins to the ones in this chapter is a coincidence but a rather illustrating one. The dispute 
between Locke and Rousseau is far from being over, even if a remarkable element to the dispute 
concerns little more than just accepting well-documented facts.
3. Quest for Heart: Compassion
In the previous chapter, we found from Rousseau the supposition that the mind of an early human 
being must have been rather tranquil compared to us moderns with our myriad social worries. Still, 
there is one remarkable emotion Rousseau suspected must have belonged to the early human mind.8 
7 For example, according to recent gallup results, 38% of the people of the US claim to believe that ”God created man in present 
form” (see Swift, 2017).
8 There is another, namely ”love” (Rousseau 1972b 203–7), which will not be considered in this essay separately since, in On 
Inequality, the discussion on ”love” is limited to reproduction. We will soon see that one could just as well identify compassion 
with a kind of universal love, and that sexual love may be seen as a natural part thereof.
13
This emotion he calls compassion, describing it as the awareness and tendency to be concerned 
about suffering and death of one's fellow beings even if the suffering does not directly involve 
oneself. And it is not only in humans but in other animals as well where Rousseau recognises 
compassion. His empirical examples include horses that ”shew a reluctance to trample on living 
bodies” and ”the mournful lowings of the cattle when they enter the slaughter-house”. (The cows 
are anxious not about their own forthcoming death but from seeing their fellows being slaughtered).
(Rousseau 1972b 199–200).
Compassion for Rousseau, it must be noted, has no socio-ethical connotations, at least in any
common philosophical sense. That is to say, compassion is not a manner of reasoning or a 
justificatory ground for moral judgements. On the contrary, it is like an instinct, a ”pure emotion of 
nature prior to all kinds of reflection” (ibid.). When struck by compassion, we do not imagine 
ourselves in place of an other being or anything like that, for compassion strikes before any clear 
notion of one's self. One should try and think about it as a selfless, or a pre-self, emotion, an 
emotion between us living beings all of whom are trying to get by in the surrounding conditions 
which are not always mere fun and games. Maybe there are biologists who would like to point out 
that the basic function of compassion is to warn us, to keep us alarmed and safe. This is not to be 
denied. But, what we are trying to learn from Rousseau is that this ”safety mechanism”, if you will, 
does not arise from selfish reflection. It is more primordial, and independent of, one's ever noticing 
any selves.9
In order to understand what we mean by saying that compassion precedes self-reflection and
is ”between beings”, it is probably worth emphasising that the compassion currently under our focus
is better understood as not quite like a colour that one may have in their eye or hair, neither is it like 
some personality trait. It is not a particular characteristic of a particular being but rather something 
that arises in the being together of beings. One might identify it with the bonds of mutual concern 
9 The word ”self” has had a lot of uses in different philosophical theories in which it is considered as the subject of one's actions, 
the object of introspection, the essence of one's identity or something like that. However, there seems to be no agreement on 
what/where the ”self” is. Upon some deliberation, the author has decided not to dive deeper into the topic of self in this essay. 
See eg. Sartre's Being and Nothingness (L'être et le neánt) for thrilling discussions.
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between beings that share an environment. 
The idea expressed here could also be clarified by saying that there is a kind of 
objectification of beings that we want to avoid in order to understand compassion. It is precisely 
rendering this being here and that being there into theoretical units of (philosophical) consideration 
which diminishes the sense of compassion. ”Do to others as you would have them do to you” may 
be a rather universal moral principle but it does not express compassion. Rather, Rousseau suggests,
compassion renders us to ”[d]o good to yourself with as little evil as possible to others” (ibid. 202). 
This formulation, though containing the word ”self”, is not about self-centered reasoning with self-
units. Rather, it has to, or at any rate could, be read as an expression of the very basic nature of 
organisms. What Rousseau's formulation from this point of view would express is that living beings
seek subsistence, obviously, ”for themselves”, for it is impossible to metabolise nutrients for others. 
In addition, they basically do it rather prudently, that is avoiding unnecessary, and naturally 
repugnant, actions like harming other organisms.10
In some sense, we could probably say that compassion is like Rousseau's counterpart to 
Locke's ”law of nature”. Recall that in Locke's state of nature there are laws that secure the property
rights of humans to the fruits of their labour, for example. But Rousseau's compassion is something 
very different indeed from these laws. The only sense in which one may call compassion ”law” is 
the same sense in which physical ”laws of nature” are laws. But one should be very careful with this
term. Neither laws of nature nor compassion order beings of the world from outside, as if the beings
were first there and then some laws were imposed on them. Rather, ”laws of nature”, compassion 
among them, are the  very conduct of the beings of nature. These laws are derived from the beings 
of nature, not imposed on them. The unrestrictedly spontaneous being of beings, their free flowing 
through existence, is precisely what the ”laws of nature” try to express. And one just needs to be 
very careful keeping in mind this is actually somewhat contradictory to the ordinary understanding 
10 For example, playing, which many animals are known to engage in (see Telkänranta 2015), is surely unnecessary for 
subsistence. The relevant difference here between frolic and vitiosity is that the former makes happy while the latter obviously 
does not. It is one of Rousseau's basic observations that human beings, naturally, do not enjoy harming other living beings. How 
our later tendency to wickedness arose is to be discussed next.
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of what a law is. 
Now that some general remarks about the nature of compassion have been made, let us consider the 
relation of compassion to ethics and morality. We have already emphasised that it would be better to
consider compassion as free from ethical connotations in any traditional sense. Still, Rousseau 
thought compassion is actually the original source of ”all [...] social virtues”, of which he lists some 
examples: ”generosity, clemency [...] humanity [...] benevolence and friendship” (ibid. 200). The 
first lesson that may be drawn here is that compassion is not a product of ethical considerations but 
their source. It is true that ethics can be seen as a tool to pursue social virtues but what is striking in 
Rousseau is the observation that we – humans, cows, and all – live by the root of these virtues 
before any ethics. Thus, in ”state of nature” we do not need to pursue these virtues particularly. 
Ethics was needed only after our social development lead us astray from the compassionate 
harmony with our fellows. Let another fable of Rousseau's clarify the idea.
First, in order for there to be ethics and moral judgements, we have to be able to value 
things. To illustrate how values invaded human perception, Rousseau invites us to imagine life in 
early human communities. Due to trivial division of labour having taken place in these 
communities, people started having leisure in their hands. This led to the birth of social pastime 
activities such as singing and dancing. And it was in the midst of this kind of activities where, 
Rousseau suspects, humans started becoming interested in the opinions of others. The best 
performers were keenly admired and everybody wanted to have their share of that admiration. 
Similarly, weak performers were scoffed. The notion of ”public esteem” had been born. (ibid. 221–
2).
Again, the historical accuracy of this fable does not matter. What is important is that 
Rousseau traces our valuing of some characteristics as worth pursuing back to comparing one's self 
with others. This is clearly expressed in footnote 10 of On Inequality (ibid. 306–8) where distinction
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between ”self-love” and ”selfishness” is being made. The first is ”a natural sentiment which inclines
every animal to regard its own preservation” while the latter prompts ”individuals to get a greater 
value on themselves than upon other men”. Notice the English translations of the words used to 
express the idea are less than excellent.11 For the purposes of the present essay, the reader is 
encouraged to emphasise ”love” in ”self-love” and associate the word with something like universal
love between beings (compassion). ”Self-love” is thus understood as a branch of compassion 
pointing  to one's own being (self-preservation). ”Selfishness”, on the other hand, should be 
understood in a rather everyday sense as the all too familiar, yet hardly desirable, characteristic of 
personality, also known as egoism or narcissism. 
In the previous section, compassion was characterised as something akin to physical laws of 
nature. Compassion was seen as a major force in the dynamics of (organic) existence in nature. 
Recognising now ”self-love” as an indispensable part of this force strengthens the conviction that 
what Rousseau draws our attention to is not a schematic justification for a social theory but the 
”physical laws” of living together in the world. ”Self-love” is the reason that compassion is not a 
miraculous guarantor of frictionless existence, free from all pain and displeasure, between beings. It
is remarkable that Rousseau's state of nature is not a utopic paradise of eternal bliss. Instead, the 
natural necessity of ”self-love” (self-preservation) sometimes leads to confrontations between 
animals (and plants) in the state of nature. It is just obvious that at times organisms have to fight 
over scarce resources and, as we observe, it is most usually each organism itself (or its offspring) 
for which the organism fights. However, the crucial point is that this harming other beings for one's 
own sake is not the root from which some ”altruists” are exceptions. On the contrary, the root is a 
coherent system of organisms living on, and violent bursts of ”self-love” are circumstantial 
exceptions from this shared being.12
11 The 1972 reprint of the 1767 English edition used here as a reference regularly confuses the two words.
12 The example of the ”cruelty” of cats who play with mice has been pointed out to the author. Apparently, prowling and catching 
prey release hormones that make cats, and other like predators, happy. This is basically why cats are tempted to prowl for strings,
paper balls etc. (Telkänranta 2015). So, the cats do not kill mice out of cruelty but because nature has rendered them enjoy this 
activity. What Rousseau observed of humans is that we normally do not enjoy witnessing, to say nothing of causing, other beings
suffer.
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Thus, whatever harms and pains humans in the state of nature may have caused each other, 
there was no ill will in this kind of, let us call it impersonal, violence. The humans involved were 
simply driven by their empty stomachs to relatively troublesome means of securing their next meal. 
It is a different case when we consider harmful actions between humans tainted by selfishness, that 
is the aspiration to shine in the eyes of public. Only after, says Rousseau, ”the party injured was 
certain to find in it [the injury] a contempt for his person”, the road to pride, jealousy, and all kinds 
of malicious plotting and distrust between people so common in modern society was opened. In 
short, ”the first step toward [...] vice” had been taken. (ibid. 222). From this it should be quite clear 
that, from Rousseau's point of view, the possibility of self-centered moral judgements and ethics 
seems actually to be a distraction from the ”natural virtue” of compassion. Strange as it may sound, 
it is an important key to understanding Rousseau's idea of humanity's original connectedness with 
nature.
In order to understand the connection between morality and our divergence from 
compassion, a few remarks on property may prove useful. As the reader may recall, Locke 
considered property as a basic element of nature. According to him, it is essential to human persons 
to appropriate the fruits of nature by their very unique way of using nature's resources, called 
labour.
From Rousseau's point of view, the development of the idea of property is closely connected 
with that of the perception of values discussed above, for property is something not only for 
satisfying ”this present hunger” but for one's personal value. The idea of accumulating wealth 
beyond one's physical needs was alien to the early human without self-esteem. It is precisely the 
notion of self-esteem that was necessary for the idea of increasing one's wealth by increasing one's 
property to appear. The consequences were less than desirable, though, since with the idea that some
people are more worthy and respectable than others also emerged social hierarchies and oppressive 
systems where the weak were made to toil and moil to increase the property of those in power.
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Rousseau had rather express views on how this emergence of the accumulation of wealth 
affected our relation with the environment. As people became greedy for social esteem and wealth, 
it of course became necessary to exploit natural resources more intensively than the early hunter-
gatherers had done. In Rousseau's words: ”[A]ll equality disappeared [...] industry became 
indispensible; vast forests became smiling fields, which it was found necessary for man to cultivate 
with the sweat of his brow, and in which slavery and misery were seen presently to germinate and 
grow up with the harvest13”. (ibid. 225–9). That selfish accumulating of property has here been 
presented as corrupting both the compassionate existence with our fellow humans and the harmony 
between us and the rest of nature is quite obvious.
As a conclusion to this chapter, let us return to considering the relation of society and nature.
As we have found, there is a remarkable difference between Rousseau and the targets of his 
criticisms, like Locke, concerning ideas about morality and society, and the role of these in 
understanding humanity's relationship with nature. For Locke, and so many modern thinkers, 
society is something that humans, already inspired by moral consciousness, established in order to 
police people from moral corruption that the nature of humanity in pre-social state entails. Laws and
government are seen as necessary procedures against morally undesired human tendencies, such as 
greed and malice, that are prone to emerge in the pre-governed way of life.
Rousseau, on the other hand, thought that only society built on the idea of property could 
give birth to all the less appealing human vices and cruel institutions like slavery and oppression. 
Rousseau, keeping to the original amorality of humanity, pointed out two remarkable things. First, it
is wrong to suppose that humans, anymore than other animals, are prone to evilness. Second, the 
kind of systematic evilness against which we need protection had to be preceded by social 
inequality14 which Rousseau saw as co-emergent with the idea of property and value-consciousness.
13 Allusion to the third book of Genesis is hardly a mere coincidence. Notice also the perceptive concern about deforestation. As a 
comparison, Locke held quite a different idea of our natural environment: ”land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no 
improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, 'waste', and should thus be cultivated by man.” See 
explanations for this disheartening opinion in Locke (1968) §§40–3.
14 Rousseau actually makes a distinction between two kinds of inequalities. By ”natural” inequality he meant the difference of 
physical features, such as body size, strength, etc. The actual theme of his essay is what more exactly would be called ”moral” or
”political” inequality, that is the social conventions that hierarchise people. (Rousseau 1972b, 164). In the present essay, 
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It was the social way of life where some people were enslaved or impoverished, while others were 
bathing in material wealth, which made it necessary for the poor to resort to violence and theft 
towards the rich.
Only in this violent unrest, caused by inequality caused by property, appeared the idea of the
institution of laws to police people. According to Rousseau's suspicions, laws and government were 
not, as Locke supposed, a mutual agreement for the common wealth of people, but a scheme by the 
rich and the powerful in order to maintain the state of social inequality and secure the possibility of 
uneven accumulation of property. In Rousseau's grandiose words: ”[S]ociety and laws [...] brought 
irretrievable destruction on natural liberty, fixed eternally the law of property and inequality, [...] 
and for the advantage of a few ambitious individuals, subjected all mankind to perpetual labour, 
slavery, and wretchedness”. (ibid. 231–5; 248–9). In other words, society and laws were for 
Rousseau the pinnacle of humanity's development away from the ignorant innocence that 
characterised our primordial existence. They are in some sense the evidence of our having stepped 
astray from the spontaneous order of compassion. 
It bears emphasising that we have stepped astray, not completely away. The branch of 
humanity on the tree of life has probably grown in an unhealthy direction but it has never left the 
tree to grow on its own. Society, morals, culture and such are all manifestations of the development 
of a species in nature, not something opposite to nature. As Rousseau put it, ”Mankind are naturally 
perverse” (Rousseau 1972a, 20). This is to say, it has become a part of our nature to defy our nature.
Thus the discussion until now should not be interpreted as a claim that modern humanity is 
morally depraved and should seek redemption from ”recurrence to nature”. Rousseau himself was 
well aware that the ”vitiated hearts” of humankind are incurable, that there is no returning to the 
”primitive equality, the preserver of innocence and source of every virtue” (Rousseau 1972a, 75–7). 
Neither is it possible for an individual to try and leave society for ”nature”. The ”whole earth” is 
already ”appropriated by others”. (Rousseau 2007, 167–8). Harsh as this may sound, there is a 
”inequality” is used to refer to the latter kind.
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precious piece of wisdom in these words. Namely, it makes no sense to lament our ”fall” from 
nature and crave for ”return” to it. There simply is no ”nature” to return to, for we never left nature 
in the first place (that would be impossible).
But why criticise the perverse defiance against our connectedness so sharply, then? Why did 
Rousseau write a whole dissertation on the ”cultivation of arts and sciences” where he resolutely 
insists on the uselessness and corruptive decadence of these self-inflating human activities? If 
evolution has rendered us ”perverse”, what is there to complain, especially as quite a many of us are
actually leading rather comfortable lives and modernity has achieved at least some kind of, though 
very scarce for most of human population, improvement in material wealth and health?
Actually, the fact that this question occurs in the first place strengthens Rousseau's point. 
What Rousseau observed already in the 18th century was that we indeed are able to turn a blind eye 
to the screaming social inequality and suffering of our fellow people, and that we indeed are cogs in
the wheels of the cruel institutions that maintain this sorrowful situation. In Emile there is a telling 
passage (Rousseau 2007, 165–6) where Emile is taken to a luxurious dinner feast, with ”course after
course” of various dishes, ”many guests, many servants [and] dainty and elegant china”. At the 
feast, Rousseau prompts the young Emile to think about how all this extravagance made its way to 
the table. Letting Emile then rack his brains, Rousseau wonders ”what will he think of luxury when 
he finds that every quarter of the globe has been ransacked, that some 2,000,000 men have laboured
for years, that many have perhaps been sacrificed, and all to furnish him with fine clothes to be 
worn at midday and laid by in the wardrobe at night”. Rather dishearteningly, the problematic of 
global inequality is still, more than 250 years later, exactly the same. 
The alarming problem is precisely that we are able to disregard our concern for the suffering 
because this part of humanity has achieved ”wealthy and comfortable” lifestyle. But one of 
Rousseau's major observations is that this concern actually exists in our hearts. That many of us do 
not feel it very strongly is a symptom of later developments of human mind towards selfish 
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reasoning and pursuit of personal wealth that tend to silence the natural tendency to compassion. 
That even more of us are not motivated to act, or are at loss for what to do, is because we are, by 
nature, creatures of this nature-opposing society. 
These may appear like wilful stipulations but they are not. The compassion that Rousseau 
talks about is not just another trick our minds can play, neither is it just a clever theoretical tool. 
Rather, it is an indispensable aspect of being in the world, that is, being environed by beings, a law 
of nature, if you will. In compassion, one might say, the connectedness of our being to the 
environment is manifest. But as we humans are now, thoroughly self-important and reason-infected,
our sense of the original connection to reality has dimmed. Or as Rousseau puts it: ”It is philosophy 
that detaches him [the reasoning human] from the rest of the world”. (Rousseau 1972b 201–2). 
Would it now be too far-fetched an idea to suggest that this disconnectedness from the rest of
the world has brought with it the various ”environmental problems” our species is known to be 
facing? This is a hypothesis that definitely needs to be examined more thoroughly, though not in the
present essay. To conclude this chapter, let us follow Rousseau in finding there is no point in trying 
to ”subvert the actual state of society”. What Rousseau saw as his task was saying ”without 
disguise, what the truth demanded of me” (Rousseau 1972a, 132–4). And this is what we would do 
well to strive for, too. Even if we currently are all occupied with ourselves and our businesses, 
compassion, the very essence of living in nature, has by no means left our hearts.
4. Conclusion
There are two questions to be answered in this concluding chapter. The first concerns bringing 
together the results of the two previous chapters that may have appeared independent to some 
extent. The second one is more general. How do these considerations on the nature and origin of 
human society and Rousseau's compassion relate to the wider problematic of nature and humanity? 
The following passage is an attempt at answering these questions.
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There is a certain, perhaps rather unusual, way in which the notion of compassion has been 
treated in the present essay. Rousseau gives no explicit directions to this way of understanding but 
one surely can gather suggestive clues from his writings. This way of understanding views 
compassion as not just an attributive emotion that some individual beings have and others do not. 
Instead, compassion is seen as a force of nature running through beings that exist together. 
Compassion is then, rather literally, understood as ”feeling together”, where that who feels is not an 
isolated subject and that which is felt is not a private sensation. It is a feeling of togetherness, of 
nature itself, arising among shared existence.
In this sense compassion is there before society, even before humanity. It is an old force, 
perhaps something like like gravity or magnetism for organisms. But it is not a characteristic that 
each organism exemplifies individually, rather it is something like a characteristic of the whole of 
organic existence. Thus compassion is seen as a key to understanding nature and our humanity, and 
also more generally, our animality and being of the ecology of the planet.15
Were a sceptic to ask where do we find this compassion, we could follow Rousseau pointing 
to the evidence of our hearts. When we go through passions together (with humans or some other 
species), when we are shaken by suffering around us, we directly encounter traces of compassion. 
We find compassion in our psychology, but a very important point of the present essay is that the 
limits of my psychology are not the limits of compassion. In addition to our psychology, we also 
encounter compassion in the order of organic nature. By this we do not mean a moral hierarchy or 
any external order imposed on beings. Instead, we focus on the order expressed by the actual, wild 
conduct of organisms. 
Does not this conduct appear ever so harmonious? See the various species of birds feeding 
and nesting on a single tree, or the rich community of decomposers in a carcass. See not only forests
and meadows but also gardens and streets as environments that sustain astonishing varieties of life. 
15 ”Ecology / -al” is an attractive, but by no means self-explanatory, word which could have been given a more central role in the 
present essay. Here this word is used for emphasising the view of nature as a whole whose parts work in webs of mutual 
interactions, as a whole where the being of individual beings is not self-sufficient but is of interactions with the environment. See
eg. Haila & Levins (1992) for further discussion.
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That these varieties form systems that maintain their existence, so called ecosystems, is a sort of 
miracle, is it not. What it is in the nature of life that makes it arrange itself as it does? What it is that 
keeps life so beautifully together?
One influential metaphor that has been used a lot to express the nature of life is ”struggle for
existence”. The struggle is due to the facts that life strives for continuance and that this continuance 
demands resources. This much is just basic dynamics of life, and in this sense life indeed is 
struggle. However, there is but a stone's throw from this piece of wisdom to the misguided metaphor
of ”war of all against all”. If the life of organisms, humans included, was fundamentally a 
continuous battle against each other, there would probably have been no life in the first place. One 
point about ”struggle for existence” is indeed that organisms usually do not have the luxury of 
warring with each other which would indeed be the most imprudent thing to do, producing nothing 
but excessive anguish. One has to be careful in telling these two ideas apart.
As was noted in chapter 3, compassion is not an ideal guarantee of a utopistic existence free 
from struggle. Instead, we characterised it as a sort of ”universal love” between beings. It was also 
noted that the self-directed branch of this love, which often has been celebrated as the fundamental 
impetus of life, is indeed but a branch of the more general attention to, and concern for, the 
environment. Recognising a remarkable universal feeling between beings as love, not hatred, is not 
just an arbitrary stipulation. It is very difficult to imagine how life could ever have organised itself 
as it has if it was driven by selfish and hostile instincts. How could ants build their hills, birds 
maintain their flocks or wolves hunt in packs without deep concern for the beings around them? 
How indeed could humans have established their first village together if they were aggressive and 
self-important egoists?
Remember that, unlike many distinguished thinkers have done, one would do well not to 
give in to the idea that early hunter-gatherers, displaying the rational human essence, were as 
calculative and ”reasoning” as we are nowadays. The first humans to form packs and establish 
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communities were probably closer to ”animals” from our point of view, that is they hardly had 
complicated self-interested strategies in mind but acted more ”on instinct”. It is this instinct at the 
heart of organic existence that we have here called compassion.
It is most certainly true that the influential idea of the world being divided in two 
fundamental realms, of nature and of humanity, has for ages prevailed in human cultures. And it 
may also be true that this idea, of us being extraordinary in and superior to nature, has been of great 
help in establishing the so called success of human societies. The development of humanity into 
cunningly strategising self-important agents has without a doubt been profitable to numerous human
beings in the course of our history. But, one may wonder whether this development has been for the 
good of our species. For Rousseau, human as a rational self-centered agent was a human ”detached 
from the world”, a human living in an illusion. Society with its morals and laws was for Rousseau a 
structure built in order to maintain this illusion of life as an insatiable pursuit of personal wealth.
The world politics now sees humanity struggling with various ”environmental problems”. 
The sustainment of the aforementioned illusion, and a fruitful relationship with the Earth, is 
threatened by unprecedently fast and unpredictable changes in ecosystems, largely caused by 
achievements of our industrialised consumer culture driven by selfishness, indifference and greed. 
The mere fact that many high level political organisations nowadays recognise that we have serious 
”problems” with environment should already be a rather telling signal of something being deeply 
wrong.
There is a tendency to accuse humanity of this ”wrong”. It has been claimed that we have 
destroyed the ecosystems and keep doing so and that we should change our ways in atonement. 
Various social institutions and the global economy should be renewed according to new 
environmental ethics. This ethics would take nature into moral considerations that until now have 
mainly concerned humanity only. This is probably what we can, and should, wish from the current 
social situation. But notice that Rousseau for one does not offer this kind of solution.
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From the point of view we have adopted from Rousseau, it would seem like a mistake to try 
and ”bring” nature into our ethical considerations, or in any case this would be totally unimportant 
as regards the actual problem. Trying to regain our connection to the rest of nature with ”rational” 
moral schemes that calculate values for ”objects” and ”actions” is precisely part of the problem; the 
problem of our having become so fond of this fortress of ours, called society, that has become the 
whole world to us outside of which there is ”nothing” (like on the countryside). That we fail to see 
nature except as a system following rules and ideologies born in our culture shows that we have 
become numb to the touch of nature – not to nature as the outside of our society, for this is an idea 
we daily embrace, but to nature as the greatest and the most wonderful, the beautiful scene of being.
It would again be overly grandiose, however, to think that humanity would have fallen from 
nature once and for all. The point is precisely that the ties with nature cannot be cut. We may defy 
and play deaf as much as we want. Such is the current stage of our evolution as a species. But, 
though it may appear difficult, we should also be able to let our hearts echo the sound of 
compassion ringing all about. Although the hustling and bustling noise of society keeps drowning 
out this harmonious sound, yet we none the less have ears to listen, still.
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